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Abstract—We present the model developed within the Vista
project, studying the future evolution of trade-offs between Key
Performance Indicators. The model has a very broad scope
and aims to simulate the changes that business and regulatory
forces have at a strategic, pre-tactical and tactical level. The
relevant factors that will affect the air transportation system
are presented, as well as the scenarios to be simulated. The
overall architecture of the model is described and a more detailed
presentation of the economic component of the model is given.
Some preliminary results of this part of the model illustrate its
main mechanisms and capabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
The air transportation system is a continuously evolv-
ing complex socio-economic entity. In order to monitor its
changes, SESAR and other bodies regularly define Key Perfor-
mance Indicators (KPIs) grouped in Key Performance Areas
(KPAs) and the associated targets to drive it in the desired
direction [1]. In particular, projects are supposed to estimate
the impact of their implementation in the system through the
use of these indicators.
However, the impact of a single change in the system, let
alone multiple changes, cannot be easily forecast because of
the high degree of entanglement of the different components
of the system, including the different stakeholders – notably
passengers, airlines, ANSPs and airports. The degree to which
the indicators depend on each other thus arises directly from
the interactions and the complex behaviours of the actors in the
system. Possible trade-offs and synergies might arise between
indicators, actors, and changes in the system.
This calls for a holistic view of the system rather than the
independent assessment of its sub-parts. Hence, the primary
objective of Vista is to quantify the current and future (2035,
2050) relationships between a currently non-reconciled set of
performance targets in Europe by using an integrated model
of the European air transportation system on which ‘what-if’
scenarios can be tested.
Vista has commenced this task by making a list of future
business and regulatory changes and how they may likely
impact on the stakeholders. In order to take into account the
complex feedback between the actors, a model with three
layers has been designed, mimicking the three temporal stages:
strategic, pre-tactical and tactical phases. The three layers have
a fine granularity in terms of scope, down to the individual
passenger for the tactical portion. They also feature complex
behaviours from the various stakeholders, whilst bearing in
mind the need to keep the model simple enough to be able to
calibrate it with real data.
This paper aims at presenting the general ideas behind
the model and some more specific details on the economic
part, trying to highlight the challenges of building a holistic
ATM model with such a broad temporal and spatial scope.
It is organised as follows. Section II presents the opera-
tional environment modelled in Vista: stakeholders, factors and
indicators. This section describes the different stakeholders
modelled; how business and regulatory factors, taken into
account to predict the evolution of the KPIs, have been
selected; and which indicators will be estimated by the model
in the future. Section III presents the model itself, first with
a general description of its architecture and then with a more
detailed description of the economic model at the heart of the
strategic layer. Section IV presents some preliminary results
obtained with the economic model. Finally, we draw some
conclusions in Section V, together with some plans for the
future of the model.
II. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
In this section, we highlight the main operational compo-
nents of the air transportation system in order to include them
in a comprehensive model. Moreover, we look at how they
are likely to change in the two time horizons set by Vista –
2035 and 2050 – defining the main drivers of these changes
as ‘factors’. Finally, we briefly look at the observables in the
system, how to measure them what to expect from the model.
A. Stakeholders
Five stakeholders are represented in the model: ANSPs,
airports, airlines, passengers, and the environment. It is the
ambition of Vista to provide a unique view of each perspective
and how these are likely to evolve. We discuss each one in
turn.
ANSPs are heavily regulated and have traditionally been
providing the full scope of air navigation services, including
CNS (communication, navigation, surveillance), AIS (aeronau-
tical information services) and, in some cases, aeronautical
meteorology. This monolithic approach is gradually changing.
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Next to pressure from the regulatory side on unbundling of
services, technological innovations such as virtual centres and
remote towers pave the way for different ANSP business
models. In some states, competition on, for example, tower
services, is enforced by the local regulator, or the ANSP itself
may decide to outsource services to increase cost efficiency.
In addition, almost all ANSPs have become engaged in one
or more strategic alliances and industrial partnerships [2]. For
example, an ANSP can at the same time join an operational
alliance on free route airspace, establish a joint venture with
a training provider and team up with ANSPs that share the
same ATM system manufacturer.
For large airports, the current business model heavily relies
on non-aeronautical revenues (parking, shopping, etc.) [3].
Most of their other revenues are from airlines using them as
hubs. Congestion is a major issue for most and they need
to implement different strategies to increase their capacity,
including soft management procedures or heavy changes in
infrastructure [4]. Small airports rely proportionally more on
their aeronautical revenues, and try to attract low-cost, point-
to-point traffic. Many of them also play the role of feeders for
hubs. The evolution of airports relies heavily on the business
models of airlines and the increase in traffic in the future.
Capacity extensions and better ATM tools (e.g. extended
arrival management) are thus to be expected at several airports.
A spectrum of private and public ownership exists, but nearly
all are heavily regulated, in particular regarding aeronautical
charges [5].
Airlines are probably the most market-driven stakeholders.
Since it is quite easy for them to reassign – or ground –
aircraft, they are able to respond to external stimuli quite
quickly. Low-cost carriers (LCCs) generally have lower yields
compared with ‘traditional’ operators. LCC expansion has
mainly been based on point-to-point (P2P) strategies, aiming
at higher utilisation by using a homogeneous fleet, and lower
costs by using secondary airports, in particular [6]. However,
more recently, some LCCs have shifted to the ‘legacy’ model
to some extent. For instance, Ryanair has started to operate
at primary airports and easyJet has agreements to feed Nor-
wegian and WestJet long-haul flights. The more ‘traditional’
carriers have been forced to lower costs, sometimes trying
to gain market share with an ‘in-house LCC’. In future, this
apparent convergence will depend,in particular, on the price
of fuel.
For the passenger, price, travel time, comfort and conve-
nience constitute some of the factors influencing their choice
[7]. The literature often defines archetypal profiles for passen-
gers, usually taking into account socio-economics and travel
purpose (often simply ‘business’ or ‘leisure’). Some profiles
have been defined during the project DATASET2050 [8], based
on several sets of data, and will be loosely adopted in the Vista
model, since different types of passenger demonstrate different
behaviours when it comes to price, convenience, etc.
The last ‘stakeholder’ is the environment, ensuring that Vista
includes the impact of emissions in the trade-off assessments
with other KPIs. Whilst noise is not included in the model, it
is planned to include a measure of CO2 emissions, which are
linear with the amount of fuel burned, and an estimate of NOx
emissions (although these strictly depend on the background
atmospheric conditions, including temperature and humidity,
and altitude [9]).
B. Factors
The evolution of the above stakeholders depends on external
factors and internal dynamical effects. As a consequence,
Vista identified regulatory and business factors and how they
will influence the system in the 2035 and 2050 framework.
Business factors define economic, technological and opera-
tional changes. Regulatory factors encompass regulations and
policy instruments that have a direct impact on air transport
operations, or that enable the implementation of business
factors. A total of 85 references have been reviewed including
ICAO, European and national regulations, SESAR documen-
tation and research publications. We have also consulted with
stakeholders.
For each factor, possible values and their expected impact
on the system have been identified. In some cases, their
quantitative impacts are based on literature reviews and goals
defined by the SESAR program. In other cases, their impact
affects how some operations are carried out. Where possible,
a discretisation between a ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ effect
of the factor is considered. These values are related to the
same baseline, for the different timeframes considered in
Vista. Indeed, for some of them, we took as reference the
late ‘time-based operations’, ‘trajectory-based operations’, and
‘performance-based operations’ targets as they were defined
by SESAR in the past [10], [11]. When possible, we mapped
them to the possible values of the factors as follows: low is
trajectory-based operations; medium is performance-based op-
erations; and, high represents an enhancement of performance-
based operations. For example, the impact of development of
foreground factor ‘traffic synchronisation tools’ is based on
SESAR defined targets which will represent an increase in
airport capacity by 1% in time-based operations and 1.07% for
trajectory-based operations, a fuel efficiency of -0.3% in time-
based operations and an increase in airspace capacity at TMAs
of 5% in time-based operations and 6.74% in trajectory-based
operations [12]. For other factors, such as ‘passenger provision
schemes’, the possible values are linked to operational changes
(e.g. modification of the threshold of entitlement to compen-
sation in case of delay) and its impact will be modelled by
changes on the behaviour of the stakeholders either directly
or indirectly (e.g. these changes might represent a higher
cost of delay, which might in turn impact the willingness
to recover delay). As the value of the factors are related to
a baseline which is not linked with the temporal evolution,
different values for the factors can be reached in 2035 and
2050 depending on the scenario considered, see below and
Table I.
1) Regulatory factors: A total of 22 regulatory factors have
been identified. They are grouped into three categories: regu-
lations affecting the gate-to-gate phase of the flight (including
 








SESAR development and integration, performance-based and
ANSP requirements regulations), regulations affecting airport
operations (grouped by legislation with impact on airport
demand, airport processes and airport access and egress),
and regulations affecting other areas in air transport (such
as passenger provision schemes, e.g. Regulation 261). As
previously mentioned, most of regulatory factors are enablers
of operational and technological changes. For example, reg-
ulation allowing the operation of UAS is needed for the
deployment of these systems, but the regulation itself, without
the business development, does not represent an impact on
the system. On the contrary, other regulations have a direct
effect on the behaviour of stakeholders and the system, this
includes, for example, changes to Regulation 261 regarding
passenger compensation, or the introduction of new emission
trading systems.
2) Business factors: 37 business factors have been classi-
fied across categories: factors affecting the gate-to-gate phase
of operations (including SESAR operational changes), airport
processes and accessibility, and factors affecting demand and
other economic variables (such as economic development in
Europe and fuel prices).
3) Scenarios: A scenario in Vista is modelled by combining
a temporal frame (current, 2035 or 2050) and individual values
for the regulatory and business factors. The high number of
factors and their possible values needs careful management at
the analysis stage. For some factors, their individual impact
will be assessed. For others, either a small impact on the
indicators measured in Vista or a high consensus on their
evolution is defined or their coupling with other factors is
very high, thus not allowing the modification of their values
independently in the model. The factors that will be analysed
in more detail are classified as foreground factors, the rest as
background factors.
Background factors are grouped in a meaningful manner
to create background scenarios to which different options
for the foreground factors can be applied. Table I shows
the different background scenarios defined. These scenarios
are created to model 2035 and 2050 timeframes with and
without high economic growth in Europe and considering
whether technology is developed to accommodate the eco-
nomic evolution. This should allow us to analyse the impact
of a shortfall of technological development along with the
individual impact of foreground factors. The values ‘low’ and
‘high’ for economy and technology then need to be mapped
to the ‘low’, ‘medium’, and ‘high’ values of each of the
background factor. This has been already been done in Vista
and some examples of values for each scenarios are given in
Table I.
A total of 14 foreground factors are identified, e.g. changes
to regulations defining passenger provision schemes. These
foreground factors are grouped into four higher-level cate-
gories: environmental and mitigation policies, regional infras-
tructure development, passenger focus and Single European
Sky evolution.
TABLE I
BACKGROUND SCENARIO DEFINITION. THE LAST COLUMN INCLUDES
TWO EXAMPLES OF THE VALUES OF FACTORS IN EACH SCENARIO.
‘BED1’ REPRESENTS THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE
EU-EFTA ZONE, WHILE ‘BTS4’ IS THE POSSIBILITY TO HAVE ENHANCED
ROUTE STRUCTURES.
Period Name Example of factor values
Current Current Current values
L35: Low economic BED1: Low
Low technology BTS4: Low
2035 M35: High economic BED1: Medium
Low technology BTS4: Low
H35: High economic BED1: Medium
High technology BTS4: Medium
L50: Low economic BED1: Medium
Low technology BTS4: Medium
2050 M50: High economic BED1: High
Low technology BTS4: Medium
H50: High economic BED1: High
High technology BTS4: High
C. Key performance indicators and trade-offs
Different indicators have been identified for each stake-
holder. They are selected considering their relevance to stake-
holders and the possibility of capture them in the model
with the degree of reliability and precision required. Specific
consultation with stakeholders has been conducted and will be
expanded on further activities to ensure that the most relevant
metrics are considered. The metrics currently considered focus
on the on time (gate-to-gate and door-to-door times, delays
experienced or generated per stakeholder, missed connections),
economic (delay hard/soft costs, value of time, revenue and
costs) and environmental performance (CO2, NOx).
The high uncertainty on the modelling of 2035 and 2050
timeframes means that the objective of Vista is not to precisely
compute the value of the indicators on a specific scenario, but
to understand the main tendencies and the trade-offs between
them under the different scenarios, timeframes and factors.
In this manner Vista will provide insight on the relationship
between indicators and factors. The trade-off methods that will
be used and results will be reported in future publications.
III. MODEL
A. General architecture
Since the breadth of the project is large, the model in Vista
is composed of different layers with timeframes aligned with
key aspects of future target setting (2035 and 2050). This is
depicted in Figure 1.
Overseeing the other layers, the ‘environment’ is designed
to be the host of all the static variables feeding the other parts
of the model. It comprises the values taken by all the factors,
but also historical data to feed to model. It communicates data
to each layer.
The first operational layer, the ‘strategic layer’, is designed
to capture high-level, long-term decisions by the stakeholders.
These decisions are based on a changing environment, com-
prising socio-economic variables (e.g. demand, fuel prices)
 








Figure 1. Architecture of the Vista model. Each layer is independent and feeds the downstream blocks.
and taking into account simple economic feedback. The strate-
gic layer has the objective of providing outputs from the
main flows between cities, down to the microscopic level of
individual schedules and passenger flows. The main features
of the economic model are described in the next section.
The ‘pre-tactical’ layer aims at transforming the conse-
quences of the strategic decisions (the schedules, passengers
flows and capacities) into realistic day-to-day operations. As
explained previously, there are different archetypes of passen-
gers in Vista, each of them having different characteristics
which translate into probabilities of making specific itineraries.
This layer is thus tasked with converting the schedules and pas-
sengers flows produced by the strategic layer and converting
them into passenger itineraries. It also produces flight plans
that could be used for the actual flight during the tactical
phase, as well as other possible flight plans available during
disruption, based on historical data and traffic patterns. The
pre-tactical layer will also estimate ATFM regulations and
delays.
The third layer is the ‘tactical’ layer, which is designed to
simulate a day of operations. As input, it takes the passenger
itineraries produced by the pre-tactical layer, as well as the
flight plans and possible airspace disruptions. It simulates the
entire day of operations by tracking, microscopically, each
passenger and each flight. It generates ad hoc delays and
disturbances, based on the information provided by the pre-
tactical layer. The model is not strongly agent-driven and
only minimal decisions are taken by the airlines during this
phase. This matches the idea that on the day of operation the
options are very much reduced for them. The tactical layer is
based on the mobility model called ‘Mercury’ and developed
during previous projects, including POEM, ComplexityCosts,
and DATASET2050.
Finally, the last layer displayed in Figure 1 is the learning
loop. Since the Vista model is actually a succession of models,
each of them feeding the one downstream, some discrepancies
could appear between the layers. For instance, the evaluation
of the cost of one minute of delay for the airline during the
strategic phase could be wrong and turn out to be significantly
different during the tactical phase. In fact, these discrepancies
are desirable, to some extent, because they exist in the real
system. The network operations centre – which takes tactical
decisions – is typically distinct from the marketing department
– which takes some strategic decisions – in most airlines.
Of course, there is some communication between them, but
this is imperfect. This is an important feature of this complex
socio-economic system1 that the actors are not hyper-rational
with perfect information but have rather a bounded rationality
with imperfect information. However, it is also important that
the information within the strategic layer is consistent with
the tactical one, to avoid unrealistic discrepancies leading to
unrealistic decisions as they will be adjusted in the mid-term.
1Of any socio-economic system in fact.
 








One possibility to achieve this is to check the output of the
tactical run and compare it with the expectations that the
agents formed during the strategic phase. This is the idea
behind the learning loop, which should be able to compute
different KPIs important to the stakeholders and thus adjust
their behaviours.
B. Economic model
In this section, we describe the economic model already
developed in Vista, for which the results are shown in Section
IV. We briefly show its functionality and the principles behind
its design. As shown in Figure 1, the economic model in
Vista is part of the strategic layer and constitutes its main
component. It is the first block of a chain of models and
thus provides information to all the blocks downstream. It
should reflect the main, high-level changes occurring in the
ATM system in the future. Its objective is essentially to take
into account the macro-economic factors to forecast the main
changes of flows in Europe. As a consequence, its output
should include the:
• main traffic flows in Europe;
• typical market shares of different airline types;
• capacities of ANSPs and airports;
• average prices for passenger itineraries.
In order to do that, the model should simulate various mecha-
nisms within the system and take into account the inputs from
the environment. In particular, it should take into account or
reflect the:
• main changes in demand, in terms of:
– volume;
– passenger heterogeneity (types).
• major business changes:
– point-to-point vs hub-based operations (airlines);
– competition vs cooperation (ANSP);
– privatisation vs nationalisation (ANSP and airports);
– etc.
• capacity restrictions and congestion, in particular:
– congestion at airports;
– ATCO resource constraints.
• major changes in costs/prices of commodities:
– fuel;
– airspace/airport charges;
– new technology developments.
All these mechanisms are directly or indirectly influenced by
several business or regulatory factors, and a list of the factors
influencing the economic model has been made to ensure that
no important ones have been omitted. In order to take all this
into account, and because of the heterogeneity of the system
in terms of flows and types of actors, it has been decided
to use a deterministic agent-based model embedded in the
network in order to find the economic equilibrium between
the different actors and how it is impacted by the changes in
the environment.
1) General flow of the ABM: The agent-based model cur-
rently features three types of agents, the:
• airport (one agent per airport);
• airline (one agent per airline);
• passengers (one agent per OD pair, including all the
possible itineraries).
Each agent has its own objective, with a specific cost function.
The simulation is turn-based, and during a turn all the agents
form expectations and decide to act accordingly in order to
reach their objectives. A turn proceeds as follows:
• airlines estimate the prices of each itinerary, based on
past prices;
• airlines estimate the delays at airports, based on past
delays;
• airlines choose their operated capacity for each airport
pair based on their cost function, the estimated delays,
and the estimated prices;
• airports estimate their traffic;
• airports decide whether to expand their capacity, based
on expected traffic and their own cost function;
• passengers choose between the different itineraries avail-
able for a given OD pair;
• the price of each itinerary is updated based on the
discrepancy between demand and supply;
• delays are updated based on real traffic;
• airports and airlines compute their final profit.
The airports also have a lag in the construction of their
capacity, contrary to the airlines. Indeed, there are several
turns between the decision to expand their capacities and the
step in which the capacity is available to airlines.
2) Cost functions: The agents have different objectives and
different expectations. First, the airlines estimate the price for
each itinerary for a given turn. This is done by using an
exponentially-weighted average of the past changes in prices.
The same technique is used with the delay generated by the
airports. Once the airline ‘knows’ the price and the delay,
it computes the optimal (seat) capacity to provide for each
airport pair, based on the following cost function, for a given
airport pair:
ca = c0 + c1S + c2S
α
= c0 + (c
0
1 + χ∆δtO + χ∆δtD)S + c2S
α. (1)
The cost structure of the airline has been chosen to reflect the
long-term choices that the airlines (are supposed to) make in
the strategic layer. Apart from the constant term, it includes
a linear term which is the cost of operating a capacity S (for
instance in number of passengers). This term can be slightly
non-linear with the capacity due to inefficiencies but we keep
it linear in the model. The coefficient c1 includes the cost of
crew, cost of fuel, cost of delay, etc. The latter is modelled as
a linear law, following the findings of [13], in which the cost
of delay is found to follow a quadratic law for airlines, with
 








a relatively weak quadratic term for lower delays2. Hence, χ
represents the cost of one minute of delay for the airline, ∆δtO
and ∆δtD being the additional delay generated by the origin
and destination airports, with respect to the initial (calibrated)
situation.
The second term is related to the cost of capital, which is
non-linear with the capacity produced. Indeed, it is important
to realise that in the model the airlines do not address the
question of the optimal capacity given the capital (goods),
but rather the optimal level of capital given the expected
costs and revenues. As a consequence, the airline adjusts its
capacity S based in fact on the underlying choice of the
capital (goods) ‘K’, here representing in particular the aircraft.
The exact cost of (additional) capital is certainly a complex
function, which depends on the size of the airline, its financial
situation, the state of the finance system, the state of the
aircraft production/leasing sector, etc. However, this function
needs to be monotonically increasing and concave in order to
have diminishing returns, which is why α > 1.
The profit of the airline for one airport pair is simply ra =
pS − ca, where p is the price of the ticket for the airport
pair AB. The optimal capacity is thus simply given by S =
((p − c1)/c2) 1α . To set the capacity provided on an airport
pair in this turn, the airline uses the estimations of p and c
that it performed previously and uses this equation. Note that
c1 in the future will include other terms, for instance ANSP
charges.
The airport is currently essentially a delay manager. Given
traffic T , the airport produces some delay because of conges-
tion, following the equation:
δt = δt0 +
T
C , (2)
where δt0 is a constant and C is defined as the capacity of the
airport. This linear phenomenological equation is often used in
the literature [15], [16], albeit usually without a constant term.
It is justifiable with queuing theory, assuming a maximum
number of movements per unit of time and a random queue for
the flights [17]. Note that other functional forms are sometimes
used in the literature, for instance with a divergence when
reaching the capacity [18]. In practice, exponential and linear
laws both fit well the data [14]. When a linear law is fitted
with data, the intercept is found to be significant for nearly
every big airport in Europe, and is sometimes negative.
Note that here we include every flight operated at this airport
in the generation of delay, either departing or arriving. It does
not preclude other types of delays to be added to the delay
of the flight, and thus represents only the part of delay purely
due to congestion at the airport (terminal and runway). The
delay generated by the airport is dependent on the traffic at
this airport, but this traffic is in turn dependent on the delay
because airlines are sensitive to it, as shown in equation 1. This
is a typical example of (negative) economic feedback, which
2But the full cost of delay is to be included in the model, including the
statistical effects studied in [14]
is resolved in the model by a convergence of the expected
levels of traffic and delays with the actual ones.
Just as the airline tries to predict the delay at the airport, the
airport tries to estimate the traffic, since it does not have direct
access to the supply function of the airlines’ agents. Once the
traffic is estimated, the airport computes its expected profit in
two hypothetical cases, its capacity:
1) remains the same, or,
2) is increased by a fixed increment.
To do this, we use for its operating cost a linear law with
respect to its capacity. A similar law has been used in [14].
Additional data would be required to compute the actual
production function of the airport and test this linearity. Once
the airport knows the two values of the profit in cases 1 and
2, the airport decides to build additional capacity if the profit
in case 2 is higher than a given threshold with respect to case
1. The airport then spends a fixed number of steps with the
current capacity, after which the capacity is increased suddenly
by a given amount.
Note that airports do not yet change their charges, as it
is currently implemented in the model. Since airports have
very diverse regulations, some react sharply to markets and
others are slower to react. As a consequence, this version of
the model considers that all airports have constant charges per
passenger. We also considered that the revenues of the airport
were linear with the traffic (in fact, the number of passengers).
In reality, there is an aeronautical component, proportional to
the number of flights (and to the number of passengers also for
some airports), and a non-aeronautical component. The latter
is more complex, and comprises parking charges, concession
rents, etc. Most of these are directly proportional to the number
of passengers or can be safely assumed to be so in the long
run (for concessions, for instance).
Finally, the passengers are represented by agents which are
quite passive. They do not forecast any value and they have
an implicit utility function which drives them to choose one
itinerary over the other. Their choice is driven by different
variables, some of them depending on other agents (such as
prices), others depending on the model environment (such as
passenger income levels). Given an OD pair, the demand on
a particular itinerary k operated is given by:
Dk = D
0
k(1− α∆pk + β∆ik)C(pk, {pl}l 6=i). (3)
This equation is composed of two terms. The first is a ‘volume’
term, sensitive to the difference in price ∆pk of the itinerary
with respect to a baseline (the initial situation) and the differ-
ence in income ∆ik of the passengers on this itinerary with
respect to the same baseline. α and β represent, respectively,
the price elasticity and the income elasticity of the passengers.
There is a huge literature (see for instance [19]–[21]) dedicated
to the computation of these two types of elasticities, which
we will use during the calibration phase of the model. The
second term C(pk, {pl}l 6=i) is a term of competition, which is
a function of the prices of all the itineraries possible for this
OD pair. It is directly inspired by choice models where, given
 








a discrete choice with different advantages and disadvantages,
passengers have a given probability to choose one option or
the other. This function of choice needs to be decreasing in
its first argument (the price of itinerary k) and increasing in
its other arguments (the prices of the itineraries l 6= k). There
are several choices possible for this function, among which
the multinomial logit function is popular, see for instance
[22]. For numerical reasons, the logit function is sometimes
problematic, so we choose instead a linear function:







with the additional constraints 0 ≤ C ≤ 1. Hence the
competition is sensitive to the difference between the price
of itinerary k and the average price of the other itineraries.
The parameter s is the (inverse of the) intensity of choice.
When it is large, the passengers are not very sensitive to
the difference of prices between different itineraries (and in
particular between airlines serving the same OD pair). In the
limit where s → 0, passengers all choose the less costly
solution, hence having perfect competition between itineraries
(and thus airlines).
Note that in reality other factors should enter the compo-
sition of the competition term. In particular, it is known that
the passengers are sensitive to the quality of service. This
is, however, difficult to calibrate, as there are no available,
substantial data on this. Another parameter is the total travel
time, since passengers are usually more attracted by shorter
travel times, e.g. selecting a direct option rather than a flight
with a connection. This is related to the complex issue of the
value of time of passengers, for which there is a substantial
literature. We thus plan to include this factor in the next
version of the model.
IV. FIRST STRATEGIC (ECONOMIC) RESULTS
In this section we explore the possibilities of the Vista
model, and more particularly its strategic component. The
results shown below have been obtained on a very simplified
setting in order to show the main mechanisms within the model
and how the interaction between the agents leads to some
non-trivial behaviours. The set-up is illustrated in Figure 2.
We define four airports – labelled from 0 to 3 – and two
airlines – A and B. One airline, A, is notionally a P2P low-cost
carrier, whereas the other, B, is a traditional, hub-based airline.
Company A operates two airport pairs: from 1 to 3 – branch
δ – and from 2 to 3 – branch . Company B operates three
airport pairs: 1 to 0, 2 to 0, and 0 to 3, respectively branches α,
β, and γ. Each branch represent notionally a certain number
of flights operating during a given period, e.g. a day.
Passengers travelling from 1 to 3 thus have two possibilities:
taking a direct flight with company A, or making a connection
at 0 with company B. The same applies for itineraries from
2 to 3. Other passengers begin their journey at 1 and finish
at 0, as well as from 2 to 0 and 0 to 3, for which they have
to take a flight with company B. We calibrate the model so
Figure 2. Representation of the configuration used to produce the results.
that company A has a lower cost than company B, but the
branches α, β, δ, and  have a relatively low demand with
respect to the branch γ. In other words, company B generates
most of its revenue from one high-yield branch, with the two
others feeding it, whereas A competes with direct flights from
1 to 3 and 0 to 3.
We wish to observe three effects in this system. Firstly,
how the increase of demand on one branch affects the other
branches. Secondly, how airlines respond to an increase in the
fuel price. Lastly, how a capacity increase somewhere in the
system affects the whole system. In order to do this, we run a
single simulation. During steps 5-15, we increase slowly the
demand on branch γ. Then around step 90, airport 3 increases
its capacity. Finally, we simulate the increase of fuel price by
increasing the parameter c10 by 20% in step 170. Note that in
reality, an increase in fuel price would have a smaller impact
on the operational cost of company B compared to company
A. However, even with the same increase, both companies
already react differently, as we see in the following.
We show in Figure 3 the evolution of the traffic on the
different branches (top panel) and the evolution of the profit of
the airports (bottom panel). Focusing first on the top panel and
dismissing the transient effects, one can see different effects.
Firstly, the increase of demand on the branch γ during the first
15 steps impacts all the airlines. More specifically, the traffic
on this branch increases, whereas the traffic on branches α
and β, belonging to the same company, decreases, and the
traffic on branches δ and  increases. This is triggered by a
simple effect: since the demand on γ increases, the price on
this branch increases. Hence, passengers willing to go from 1
to 3 with company B now have a higher total price for their
ticket because of this branch. As a consequence, some of them
switch to the competition, i.e. to the direct flights on branches
δ and .
Around step 90, airport 3 increases its capacity. The direct
consequence for companies having flights landing at 3 is
that their cost is decreased, because the delay at this airport
decreases. One could naively think that all will benefit from
this increase of capacity, or at least not lose anything. However,
this is not what happens, since both branches of company A
indeed have higher traffic, whereas all branches from company
B see traffic decrease. Since company A is cost-driven, the
increase of capacity allows it to decrease its prices from 0
to 3 and 1 to 3 to a greater extent than company B, and thus
 








Figure 3. Evolution of the traffic per branch (top panel) and the profit
per airport (bottom panel) during a simulation. The simulation increases the
demand on branch γ between step 5 and step 15, airport 3 increases its
capacity around step 90, and the cost of all airlines are increased at step 170
by 20%.
capture all of the additional traffic, and more. This mechanism
also has an impact on the airports. If airports 1 and 2 see their
profit increase because the traffic on branches δ and  increase,
airport 0 ends up with a slightly smaller profit. Whereas one
could have expected a higher profit for any airport connected
with another airport undergoing a capacity extension, the hub
of company B actually suffers from this situation.
Finally, around step 170, the operational costs of the airlines
are increased as described above. As seen in Figure 3, the
different branches react differently to this increase. The most
affected are branches δ and , which lose a sizeable share
of their traffic. Branches α and β are also affected, but γ,
on the other hand, sees its traffic increase. This happens for
the same reasons as previously outlined during the capacity
increase. Indeed, since this branch is notably less cost-driven
than the others (because of its high-yield market), it captures
some of the lost traffic on the other branches, where the prices
have risen significantly.
The model is thus able to capture complex economic feedback
in the system, due to the adaptation of the agents to chang-
ing conditions. This non-trivial feedback is triggered by the
heterogeneity of the agents, which have different roles and
different objectives, and powerful network effects.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented the main foundations on
which the Vista model is being built and its objectives. We
have highlighted the need for a holistic approach because
of the entanglement of the different sub-parts of the system,
taking into account the heterogeneity of agents, their numerous
interactions, and the influence of external factors. We have seg-
regated these into background and foreground factors. These
categories help Vista to focus on a few scenarios instead of
having to test each factor independently. We have explained the
sequential architecture of the full model, featuring three layers
mappable on the strategic, pre-tactical, and tactical phases of
ATM. The layers are independent simulations and may be
used in other simulation engines in future. The tactical layer
is already implemented and has been used in several other
projects, in which it has demonstrated its capabilities.
More recently developed is the strategic layer, including
the economic model that we have described in more detail.
Required to be computationally light but including economic
feedback, it has been designed as a network-based determin-
istic agent-based model in order to take into account hetero-
geneous behaviours in the system and network feedback. The
first results from this model have been presented. Although run
on a non-calibrated and highly simplified scenario, it demon-
strated its capability to produce complex behaviours arising
from the competing, heterogeneous agents in the system. In
particular, the sensitivity to cost for airlines combined with the
competition with other airlines triggers non-trivial responses
when the system is disturbed.
Future work includes the full integration of the different
layers into one single engine, which can produce a typical
day of (future) operations, taking into account all the factors
influencing these layers. We also need to improve the model
by adding certain features, such as including some pro-active
(instead of essentially passive) ANSPs. We are entering the
final stages of stakeholder consultation, through a series of
presentations and workshops. Finally, the model needs to be
properly calibrated, both on the current situation and for the
future scenarios. This requires some data mining to train
the model properly, and further calibration against published
traffic and passenger forecasts. This will then allow us to move
to the ultimate objective of examining the trade-offs between
the stakeholder KPIs, demonstrating whether future alignment
improves or deteriorates, and the underlining drivers of such
behaviour.
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